No More Talks — Katon Moyong on the Siang Dam

Katon Moyong · Arunachal Press Club, Itanagar · 5 Nov 2026 · Video: The Arunachal Times

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Transcript and contextArunachal Press Club, Itanagar5 November 2026

“No more talks” Katon Moyong on the Siang dam

Days after Delhi Police detained him outside Arunachal Bhawan, the anti-dam activist known as Aborman rejected the government’s invitation to talks on the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project. Scroll to see what is at stake upstream and downstream, then hear him in full.

Video
The Arunachal Times
Length
40:59
Medog research
Kyang Thang
02
What SUMP is
The Siang Upper Multipurpose Project is a proposed storage dam on the Siang in Upper Siang, the homeland of the Adi. NHPC is preparing its pre-feasibility report for the Ministry of Jal Shakti.² On 3 Nov 2026 Chief Minister Pema Khandu said no decision to build it had been taken.³
- 11,000–12,500 MW reported capacity; no report published⁴⁵⁷⁸
- ≈9.2 bn m³ proposed live storage²
- 27 / 43 villages submerged or affected, per SIFF⁶
- 250 m reported dam height at Parong, the preferred site⁶
03
Two cases
Government Store water against floods, dry-season shortages and sudden releases from China’s 60,000 MW Medog project upstream.³⁹¹¹

Community Submergence of Adi villages and farmland. Communities also reject the armed deployment used to force survey drilling, and dispute the village MoUs presented as consent.⁶⁸¹²
04
How it came to this
1. 2008The Centre declares a Siang storage project a national project.³
2. Dec 2022NHPC drafts a pre-feasibility report on three sites: Dite Dime, Ugeng and Parong.⁶
3. May 2025Central forces deploy at Beging for survey drilling, and a dharna begins.⁸
4. Jul–Dec 2025Six villages sign MoUs for the survey; some residents dispute them.¹³¹⁴
5. Oct 2026The CM invites SIFF to talks. On 23 Oct the NHPC office and a police station in Pasighat are set on fire.¹⁶¹⁷¹⁸
6. 31 OctDelhi Police detain about 40 protesters, Moyong among them.¹⁹²⁰
7. 5 NovMoyong rejects the invitation to talks.
05
Floods come down from Tibet
The case for SUMP rests on what comes down the river from Tibet. Three times in 26 years, a lake that formed suddenly there has burst and flooded the country downstream: on the Siang in 2000, and on Nepal’s Bhote Koshi in July 2025 and again in August 2026.³⁶⁴⁰⁴¹
None of the three began at a dam.
06
26 August 2026: a mountain falls
Ice and rock broke off the north face of Langtang-Lirung, on the Tibetan side. The avalanche became a debris flow and dammed the Lhende Khola. The lake behind it broke through and sent a surge down the Bhote Koshi and the Trishuli.³⁶³⁷
USGS traced the seismic signal to the collapse itself, so this was neither a dam failure nor a glacial-lake burst.
Keep scrolling to follow the surge. The river line is approximate.
07
The cost
0dead in Nepal (Red Cross, 27 Oct). NDRRMA counted 1,367 on 9 Sep 0missing as of 9 Sep 0hydropower projects damaged: 256 MW operating and 3,795 MW under construction
The flash-flood warning system was tuned to monsoon floods, and its upstream stations were swept away before they could raise an alert. Here the hydropower plants were among the casualties.³⁷³⁸³⁹
08
It has happened on the Siang
In April 2000 a landslide dammed the Yigong river in Tibet. When the dam gave way in June, it released about 2–3 billion m³ of water. The surge reached Pasighat, 462 km downstream, and raised the Siang by 5.5 m.⁴¹
Scroll to follow the surge.
09
What China is building at the Great Bend
This chapter draws on a 14-post open-source thread by Kyang Thang (@Kyangs_Thang), 1 Nov 2026. He compiled and translated Chinese netizens’ readings of the project plan shown at the July 2025 inauguration. He notes that Indian media have carried little of this detail.⁴²

The 60,000 MW Medog project is not one wall across the river. It is a chain of three holding dams joined by long diversion tunnels. The river falls more than 2,000 m around the Great Bend, and that drop produces most of the power.⁹⁴²
10
Mainling: the big reservoir
The uppermost dam sits near Mainling town (29.2037, 94.0787), on a wide plain at about 2,950 m.
- 130–150 m tall
- ≈16 bn m³ of storage, more than SUMP’s 9.2
- Reservoir up to 3,070 m, kept below the Lhasa–Nyingchi railway that runs nearby
- Construction began July 2025 with an inauguration. Time-lapse imagery shows the site works growing fast.
Source: Kyang Thang’s thread, post 4–7. Open-source estimate, unofficial.⁴²
11
Pé: where the river is diverted
At Pé (29.5699, 94.8982), the true entry to the upper gorge, a lower dam would create the storage and diversion reservoir.
- 10–20 m above ground, at 2,900 m
- High water at 2,920 m
- ≈550 million m³
Plans show a new Pé township and a new bridge across the reservoir. The existing bridge could go under.
Source: Kyang Thang’s thread, post 8–9. Open-source estimate, unofficial.⁴²
12
Through the mountain, not around it
Between Pé and the lower gorge near Medog, the river loops around Namcha Barwa for well over 150 km. The tunnels would cut across in about 46 km, dropping more than 5,500 ft. Two intermediate cascade stations and holding reservoirs are expected along the way. The route runs parallel to the G219 highway and its Doshong La tunnel.
Orange: the river’s route around the bend. Black: the tunnel, with its two stations. Positions are approximate.
Source: Kyang Thang’s thread, post 10. Open-source estimate, unofficial.⁴²
13
Xirang, and a gorge that slides
The last dam, at Xirang (29.2551, 95.1902) near Beibeng township (Drepung in Tibetan), is thought to be a final storage dam that would steady the water coming out of the tunnels. Some groundwork is visible, but its design is not known.⁴²

The gorge is itself unstable. He points to a massive landslide area in the Tsangpo gorge that “sometimes threatens to collapse/flood”, and links to SANDRP’s report on a landslide there on 22 March 2021.⁴²
Source: Kyang Thang’s thread, post 11, 13. Open-source estimate, unofficial.⁴²
14
So does Medog store water?
Moyong says China is “not storing the water. They’re just diverting” (17:36). His account of the tunnels matches the thread. But if the netizens’ figures hold, Mainling alone would store about 16 bn m³ and Pé a further 0.55 bn m³.⁴²

On the “water bomb” fear, Kyang Thang writes that he is “not sure if it’s convincing enough”. If the concern is real, he suggests, the government can inform the community, sign a liability waiver and put early-warning systems in place.⁴²
15
SUMP: a cushion, if it is kept empty
Yigong surge, 2000: 2–3 bn m³SUMP live storage: ≈9.2 bn m³Mainling, China: ≈16 bn m³ (reported)
SUMP could absorb a Yigong-sized surge only if it were held partly empty, while a hydropower reservoir is normally kept full.²²⁵⁴¹ Nepal shows the other side: a dam in an unstable gorge is itself exposed to the same hazard.
16
The Adi heartland
The stretch from Tuting through Yingkiong to Geku is the core of Adi cultural life. Kyang Thang estimates that a 300 m SUMP could submerge more than two-thirds of it, and calls such a dam “quite infeasible: the cons outweighing pros”. Mongabay reports the height at Parong as 250 m; the design is unpublished.⁴²⁶

He also argues the government must explain what hydropower could offer, such as jobs and industry, and discuss alternative sites or smaller cascade dams with the community.⁴²
17
Who lives here
The 2011 census counted 1,57,657 Adi, nearly all along the Siang and its neighbouring valleys. Circle area is proportional to each district’s count.²¹
18
And downstream
Below Pasighat the Siang meets the Dibang and Lohit to form the Brahmaputra. In 2011, 2.76 crore people lived in Assam’s Brahmaputra valley, about 175 for every Adi. The river then continues into Bangladesh.²²
That ratio is the political arithmetic of the dam, but it measures who is exposed to floods, not who a dam would protect.
19
Now hear him
Moyong says the time for talks is over. Below: his argument point by point, the numbers on both sides, what Indian law actually guarantees, and the full 41-minute press conference with a searchable transcript.
Read his argument ↓

Moyong’s argument

His case, in his words, with timestamps. Claims are his own unless footnoted.

01
Consent, not conquest
“You came with books and medicine, we respected that… If you come with guns, if you come with armies, that’s how we’ll retaliate.” 01:46
The Adi joined India by consent and were never conquered by Tibet, the Ahoms or the British. He says that bargain sets the limit on what the state may take.
02
A 47-year refusal
“It is a 47-year-old fight of Abor people, the Adi people.” 02:42
He counts three attempts: a Brahmaputra flood-control proposal in 1979, a set of Lower and Upper Siang projects from 2003 to 2022, and SUMP from 2022. Each time, he says, the traditional councils refused.
03
The reason keeps changing
“1979, flood mitigation, 2008, national interest, 2017, national project, and 2026… national security and water bomb.” 13:45
He argues that a project whose stated purpose keeps shifting is looking for a reason, not answering a need.
04
Medog is not a water bomb
“It’s not a dam. It’s a run-of-river project… They’re not storing the water.” 17:36
He argues that China is diverting flow through tunnels at the Great Bend rather than storing it behind a wall, so the flood-cushion case falls away. Published descriptions of tunnels and cascade stations broadly match his account.²⁷ But an open-source reading of the project plan describes three holding dams, the largest at Mainling with a reported 16 billion m³.⁴² If that is accurate, Medog does store water, more than SUMP would, and his “not storing” claim is wrong.
05
Diplomacy, not dams
“It’s your duty to go to China and talk with their diplomats.” 20:07
On his account, a water-sharing deal with China is the government’s job. It should not be pushed onto Adi villagers as a reservoir.
06
A militarised valley
“For every six Adi people, there’s one armed personnel.” 20:45
He says law only binds when “both the parties are equal” (31:52). An armed force at the farm gate, in his view, makes consultation coercive. The ratio is his figure and has not been verified.
07
The rivers were sold behind their backs
“He signed more than 145 MOUs… with 65 hydropower companies.” 09:02
He says state governments signed hydropower agreements for 45,000 MW between 1987 and 2015, with upfront premiums but no benefit to the villages. He displays documents but has not released them, and the page has not verified the figures.
08
Development, yes; the main stem, no
“You can build dams in the tributaries, but not in the main stem.” 24:43
He says he is not against development, and asks for border trade with China (35:57). His line is the Siang itself: “Discussion ka time khatam ho gaya” — the time for discussion is over.

Representation: his claim vs the record

He says	The record shows
He speaks for “the 39 traditional village councils” (00:20). Later it is “my 60 village councils” (26:39).	The count changes within the same press conference. No council resolution has been published.
“99% is not accepting this dam and nobody gave you MOU” (27:23).	Riga, Riew, Beging, Parong, Karko and Komkar signed MoUs for the pre-feasibility survey between July and December 2025. The state says Parong signed with 62% of households.¹³¹⁴
MoUs were extracted by setting villages against each other, “divide and rule” (26:52).	Some residents dispute the MoUs.⁸ The MoUs consent only to a survey, not to the dam.

What is not known: nobody has surveyed Adi opinion. Neither his 99% nor the government’s MoUs measure how many Adi support or oppose the dam. Opposition is clearly organised and vocal, but how much of the community it represents is unmeasured.

Tone

He does not insult the villages that signed; he casts them as pressured. His contempt goes at politicians and officials:

“idiot political parties” 02:50
BJP leaders “bootlicking” the Centre 21:42
“eat your commission… for your corrupt means” 19:20
“You are a failed politician and bureaucrat” 20:22
“more than 200 MPs are murderers, rapists, uneducated” 38:53
To social-media commenters: “You fools” 17:41

Toward the armed forces it turns to threat. They “will be removed peacefully or by force soon” (21:17), and the dam cannot happen unless the state is willing to “exterminate” the Adi (25:38). His call for diplomacy with China (20:07) is made the same way, as an accusation of incompetence rather than a proposal.

Individual rights vs the greater good

Population figures: Census of India 2011, the latest count. Each side's argument is summarised here, not endorsed.

Moyong says he speaks for the Adi village councils of the Siang: 39 of them at one point (00:20) and 60 at another (26:39). The government says the dam would protect the far larger population living downstream. The bars below show both groups at the same scale.

Adi people in Arunachal Pradesh²¹1,57,657
… of whom live in Upper Siang, the dam district²¹25,451
People in Assam hit by floods in an average year, 1953–2016²⁴≈26,00,000
Population of Assam’s Brahmaputra valley²²2,75,80,977

Linear scale. The Brahmaputra valley holds about 175 people for every Adi. The Adi count is Census 2011, ST-15 table. It adds the tribes enumerated as Adi, Abor and the Adi sub-groups (Minyong, Padam, Pasi, Bori, Bokar, Pailibo, Ramo, Ashing, Millang, Simong, Pangi, Karka, Komkar, Tangam). It excludes the Galo (79,327), who are now a separate tribe. Community leaders put the Adi at about 3 lakh today.²⁶ District table (CSV)

Rights The case for the Adi veto

The cost falls on a small, identifiable group. The Siang Indigenous Farmers’ Forum (SIFF) says 27 villages would be fully submerged and 43 affected.⁶ Ancestral land lost to a reservoir cannot be recovered.
Consent has been sought under armed deployment, and some residents dispute the village MoUs.⁸¹³ Moyong calls this a 47-year fight (02:42).
The benefit is not established. The pre-feasibility report is unpublished, and no study has said how many people downstream the reservoir would protect.

Greater good The case for the dam

About 2.76 crore people live in the Brahmaputra valley that the Siang feeds.²² In the Rashtriya Barh Ayog’s assessment, 39.58% of Assam’s land is flood-prone.²³
China is building a 60,000 MW project at Medog, upstream on the same river.¹¹ A 2022 Ministry of Jal Shakti report says SUMP “will act as a flood cushion” against sudden releases from it.²⁵
Proposed live storage of about 9.2 bn m³ would give India its own water reserve on the river.²

What the numbers do not settle

The 2.76 crore figure measures exposure, not protection. It counts everyone living in the Brahmaputra valley. It does not count the people a Siang reservoir would actually shield. Experts quoted by Scroll argue that a hydropower reservoir is kept full and could even out releases from Medog “for a few days” at most.²⁵ Until the pre-feasibility report is published, nobody outside government can size the cover.
The Adi do not speak with one voice. Moyong speaks for the councils that oppose the dam. Riga, Riew, Beging, Parong, Karko and Komkar have signed MoUs.¹³ How many of the 1.58 lakh Adi either side represents is not on record.
Judgment, not data: The headcount ratio sizes the two groups but does not decide between them. Whether a majority’s benefit can override a minority’s land rights is a question of law and values. Arithmetic cannot settle it, and the size of the benefit is itself unproven.

Rights in the Republic

What Indian law gives a citizen, and a tribal community, when the state wants their land. Compiled 6 Nov 2026. This is not legal advice.

Moyong appeals to a bargain made in the 1950s (“you came with books and medicine”) and to the authority of the traditional councils. The Constitution offers a different and narrower set of protections, and several of them stop at Arunachal’s border.

The key point

No Indian law requires the Adi villages to consent before land is taken for SUMP. The consent rules cover private and public-private projects, Fifth Schedule areas and recognised forest rights. Arunachal has no Scheduled Area, and it had filed no claims under the 2006 Forest Rights Act as of 31 Dec 2021. The village MoUs and the Chief Minister’s promise that the decision “will depend on consent” are therefore political commitments, not legal ones. (Judgment, from the statutes cited.)³⁰³¹³

Property
A constitutional right, not a fundamental one
Since the 44th Amendment (1978), Article 300A lets the state take property only by law, with fair procedure and compensation. It gives no right to refuse.²⁸
Life and livelihood
A right to be heard, not a veto
Article 21 covers livelihood. In Olga Tellis (1985) the Supreme Court upheld the evictions but required a fair hearing first.²⁹
Land acquisition
The 2013 Act: assessment and compensation
Acquisition for a public-sector company such as NHPC needs a social impact assessment, compensation and resettlement. The Act’s 80%/70% landowner-consent rule applies only to private and public-private projects.³⁰
Scheduled Areas
Arunachal is outside both Schedules
Arunachal is in neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Schedule. So gram-sabha consent under the 2013 Act, PESA (the Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas Act) and the Samatha ruling do not reach Upper Siang.³¹
Article 371H
Law and order, not land
Arunachal’s special provision gives the Governor responsibility for law and order. Unlike Nagaland’s Article 371A, it does not protect land or customary law.³²
Customary land
The 1947 Jhum Regulation
Customary jhum land can be taken with “no formal acquisition proceedings”: a show-cause hearing and compensation. Since the Mihin Laling judgment (2025), compensation cannot fall below 2013-Act levels.²⁸
Precedent
Narmada (2000)
The Supreme Court held that displacement does not by itself violate fundamental rights if oustees are rehabilitated and left better off. It also declined to second-guess policy decisions on large dams.³³
International
Consent under UNDRIP
Article 10 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) bars relocation without free, prior and informed consent. India voted for it in 2007, but declared its “entire population” indigenous. The declaration is not binding law.³⁴
Protest
Peaceably and without arms
Article 19 protects speech and peaceful assembly, subject to reasonable restrictions. Courts have struck down blanket bans (MKSS, 2018) but allow protest to be confined to designated places (Shaheen Bagh, 2020). The Pasighat arson falls outside this protection.³⁵

What the law does guarantee is process: an impact assessment, a hearing, compensation at the 2013 floor, rehabilitation, and the right to protest peacefully. Whether the state would use the 2013 Act or the 1947 Jhum Regulation for SUMP is not known.

The full press conference

Katon Moyong speaks in Adi dress at the Arunachal Press Club. Video: The Arunachal Times; mirrored here so the transcript can follow it.

Full transcript

Machine transcription. It may contain errors, so check against the video before quoting.

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“No more talks” Katon Moyong on the Siang dam

What SUMP is

Two cases

How it came to this

Floods come down from Tibet

26 August 2026: a mountain falls

The cost

It has happened on the Siang

What China is building at the Great Bend

Mainling: the big reservoir

Pé: where the river is diverted

Through the mountain, not around it

Xirang, and a gorge that slides

So does Medog store water?

SUMP: a cushion, if it is kept empty

The Adi heartland

Who lives here

And downstream

Now hear him

Moyong’s argument

Consent, not conquest

A 47-year refusal

The reason keeps changing

Medog is not a water bomb

Diplomacy, not dams

A militarised valley

The rivers were sold behind their backs

Development, yes; the main stem, no

Representation: his claim vs the record

Tone

Individual rights vs the greater good

Rights The case for the Adi veto

Greater good The case for the dam

What the numbers do not settle

Rights in the Republic

A constitutional right, not a fundamental one

A right to be heard, not a veto

The 2013 Act: assessment and compensation

Arunachal is outside both Schedules

Law and order, not land

The 1947 Jhum Regulation

Narmada (2000)

Consent under UNDRIP

Peaceably and without arms

The full press conference

Full transcript